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Editor: Duane R. Nedrud, Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas City, Kansas City, Missouri

JAMES H. DEWEESE ELECTED PRESIDENT OF NDAA; FRED E. INBAU
RECEIVES "FURTHERANCE OF JUSTICE" AWARD
James H. DeWeese, Prosecuting Attorney of
Miami County, Troy, Ohio, was elected President
of the National District Attorneys' Association to
succeed Patrick Brennan, Prosecuting Attorney
of South Bend, Indiana. The following officers
were also elected: Executive Vice President, Keith
Mossman, Vinton, Iowa; Treasurer, Fred E. Sisk,
L'as Animas, Colorado; Secretary, Harry Ackerman,
Tucson, Arizona; Vice Presidents, Garrett H.
Byrne, Boston, Massachusetts; William F. Frye,
Eugene, Oregon; Richard E. Gerstein, Miami,
Florida; Albin P. Lassiter, Monroe, Louisiana;
William B. McKesson, Los Aigeles, California;
Frank H. Newell, III, Towson, Maryland; George
M. Scott, Minneapolis, Minnesota; William J.
Raggio, Reno, Nevada; Historian, Emory L.
Carlton, Tappahannock, Virginia; Associate Member, Executive Committee, Melvin G. Rueger, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Fred E. Inbau, Professor of Law at Northwestern University, was chosen to receive the

Furtherance of Justice Award for 1961. Professor
Inbau is the fourth recipient of this award.
Previous awards have been given to J. Edgar
Hoover, Director of the F.B.I.; Frank S. Hogan,
District Attorney of New York County; and
Frank E. Moss, United States Senator from Utah,
and two term president of NDAA. An embossed
brass plaque was presented to Professor Inbau by
President Patrick Brennan. The wording of the
plaque is as follows:
"Furtherance of Justice Award to Fred E.
Inbau, Professor of criminal law, Northwestern
University for his outstanding contributions,
resourcefulness and originality as lecturer and
author. He has rendered great service in
enhancing the administration of criminal justice
as director of Northwestern University's short
courses and conferences for prosecuting
attorneys, defense counsel, newsmen, police
officials, judges and legislators. Presented at the
12th annual meeting at Portland, Oregon, on
July 29, 1961."

PUBLIC SAFETY v. INDIVIDUAL CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE PROSECUTOR'S STAND
FRED E. INBAU
The author is Professor of Law at Northwestern University. This address was the keynote address
at the 1961 Annual Conference of the National District Attorneys' Association in Portland, Oregon,
July 26, 1961.
Today we are faced with a serious international
threat to our national existence. This we all know
and recognize; and we are taking reasonable and
appropriate measures to guard against any Coinmunist attack upon this country. We are also

trying to hold back the threat to the security of the
free world generally. What many of us don't
realize, however, is that we are also faced with
another serious threat to our public safety and
security from another kind of enemy right within
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our own borders-unorganized as well as organized
criminals. Just yesterday the F.B.I. released a
report which reveals that although the population
in 'this country has increased 18% since 1950,
the crime rate has increased 98%. Murder, rape,
or assault to kill occurs every 3 minutes. A burglary is perpetrated every 39 seconds. Robberies
and burglaries in 1960 were 18% higher than in
1959.
We are not only neglecting to take adequate
measures against the criminal element; we are
actually facilitating their activities in the form
of what I wish to refer to as "turn 'em. loose"
court decisions and legislation. To be sure, such
decisions and legislation are not avowedly for the
purpose of lending aid and comfort to the criminal
element, but the effect is the same. It is all being
done in the name of "individual civil liberties."

DANGER SIGNS IN SuP EE Co-uRT DEcISIoNs
What particularly disturbs me, and I am sure
many of you, is the dangerous attitude that has
been assumed by the United States Supreme Court.
The Court has taken it upon itself, without constitutional authorization, to police the police. It
has also functioned at times as a super-legislative
body. Moreover, even as regards its constitutionally authorized judicial function, the Court has
gone far beyond all reasonable bounds in imposing
its own divided concepts of due process upon the
states. It has also gone much too far as regards its
concepts of admissibility of evidence in criminal
prosecutions in the federal courts. "
These are harsh words, I know. But the time
has come for some plain speaking with respect to
what has been going on in the field of criminal law.
I propose to demonstrate to you the validity of
every statement I have just made. Before doing
so, may I make it clear at the outset that I am not
opposed to the Bill of Rights. I believe in the Bill
of Rights, which is so often shaken in the face of
some of us by flag-waving civil libertarians when
these critical issues of criminal law administration
are under discussion and debate. I believe in due
process, equal protection, free speech, and all else.
But I also believe that we should not be unmindful
of what is contained in the Preamble to the Constitution itself. The Preamble states that the
purpose of the Constitution was "to establish
justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the
common defense, promote the general welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity."
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THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

To illustrate what I have in mind, let me start
off with a recent United States Supreme Court
decision, Mapp v. Ohio,' which imposed the exclusionary rule upon all the states as a requirement of
due process, whereas previously it was only a rule
of evidence applicable in about half the states and
in the federal courts also.
For many years the United States Supreme
Court held that state ourts and state legislatures
were at full liberty to accept or reject the exclusionary rule with respect to evidence obtained as a
result of unreasonable search and seizure. The
Court said so as recently as 1949 in Wolf v.
Colorado.2 In that case the Court held that although
the Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and
seizure provision was applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, the admissibility of evidence thus seized was a matter for
each state to decide. Now, this June, the Court
holds that if a state admits such evidence it is a
violation of due process! All states, therefore,
must follow the exclusionary rule.
Some eminent jurists of the past, including
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, at the time when he
sat on the New York Court of Appeals, were
opposed to the exclusionary rule. In his celebrated
opinion in People v. DeforeO Justice Cardozo gave
some clear cut, sensible reasons why New York
chose not to follow the exclusionary rule. He
adhered to the view that relevant evidence should
not be brushed aside and ignored solely because
of the methods the police used to obtain it. The
great scholar, Dean John Henry Wigmore,, was
opposed t6 the rule, and in his monumental
treatise on Evidence he pointed out .the historically
unfounded judicial reasoning that was used in the
4
first federal case to adopt the exclusionary rule.
In any discussion of the pros and cons of the
exclusionary rule, consideration' should also be
given to the fact that the free, law abiding countries of England and Canada have always admitted evidence even though it may have been
unreasonably seized.
After all these years of a general recognition of
the exclusionary rule as a rule of evidence only,
and after it was for so long proclaimed to be such
by the Supreme Court itself, the Court in Mapp
v. Ohio suddenly labels the rule to be a require181 S.Ct. 1684 (1961).
2338 U.S. 25 (1949).
3242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
4See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184 (1940).

1962]

PUBLIC SAFETY v. INDIVIDUAL CIVIL LIBERTIES

ment of due process. Of little comfort is the fact
that three of the nine justices (Frankfurter,
Harlan, and Whittaker) adhered to the former
viewpoint.
Why this change in the Court's attitude? The
answer, in my opinion, is very simple. It's just
another example of the Court's continuing efforts
to police the police-and that is an executive, or
at most a legislative function of government. It
certainly is not the constitutional function of the
judiciary.
One further word regarding Mapp v. Ohio, and
this will be of concern to those of you who come
from the states that have been admitting illegally
seized evidence. What courts will decide whether
the evidence has been unreasonably seized? Your
state courts? And will their decisions be final?
Or will the decisions be the subject of federal
court review by an independent determination of
unreasonableness? If the latter-and that has
been the trend-you had better plan on enlarging
your staff to keep up with the volume of business.
And we'll need more federal judges. In fact, we'll
need more justices on the Supreme Court itself.
Furthermore, you'll experience some real jolts
if the same standards of "unreasonableness" are
applied to your own cases as in many federal
cases. You recall Work v. United States,5 where
looking into a narcotic peddler's garbage can
was held to be an unreasonable search. There are
also such cases as Morrison v. United States,6
where the court suppressed as evidence the soiled
handkerchief found in a sex pervert's shack, after
it was pointed out by a child victim who led the
police to the location and told them where they
would find the handkerchief the offender used to
dean himself off after the commission of his act.
The Court held that the handkerchief was merely
evidentiary material; that since it was not an
instrument of the crime, or the fruits of the crime,
or a weapon, or contraband, it was not subject
to seizure.
CONFESSIONS
Another recent Supreme Court decision, Culombe v. Connecticut,7 further illustrates the Court's
growing assumption of power over the states and
their courts and police. The facts of the case need
not concern us now. What is important is the
Court's pronouncement that if it finds a criminal
5243 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
6262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
781 S.Ct. 1860 (1961).

confession has been coerced, the state court conviction will be reversed even though it is "convincingly supported by other evidence."
If the present trend continues, the time is not
far off when the Court will impose upon the state
courts-as a due process requirement-the same
kind of rule that now prevails in the federal courts
by reason of the McNabb-Mallory decisions. 8 As
you know, those two cases hold that if a confession
is obtained by federal officers during a period of
unnecessary delay in taking the arrestee before a
committing magistrate, the confession is not
usable as evidence, regardless of how voluntary
or trustworthy it may be.
Even before the Supreme Court gets around to
doing that, however, some of what the Court has
already said and done as regards the federal law
enforcement officers will have "rubbed off" on
the state courts, and they will establish similar
rules even though they are not required to do so
by any United States Supreme Court decision. As
an example of that, there is the 1960 decision of
the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Hamilton,9 in which the Michigan Court adopted the
McNabb-Mallory rule. It did so of its own volition,
since the rule has not thus far been labeled as a
requirement of due process. So now, in Michigan,
if there is a delay in taking an arrested person
before a committing magistrate, and the court
finds that the delay was for the purpose of interrogating the arrestee with a view to obtaining a
confession if he happens to be guilty, the confession is inadmissible as evidence.
Let me give you another example of state court
activity along a similar line. The New York Court
of Appeals recently held-in People v. Waterman,0
that law enforcement officers have no right to
interrogate anyone after he has been indicted-or,
to put it another way, after the "formal commencement of the criminal action." The reasoning
back of the decision appears in the following excerpt-from the court's opinion:
"An indictment is the 'first pleading on the
part of the people' ... and marks the formal
commencement of the criminal action against
the defendant. Since the finding of the indictmerit presumably imports that the People have
legally sufficient evidence of the defendant's
guilt of the crime charged ... the necessities of
1 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957);
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
9 357 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738 (1960).
10 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445 (1961).
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appropriate police investigation 'to solve a
crime, or even to absolve a suspect' cannot be
urged as justification for any subsequent questioning of the defendant.... Any secret interrogation of the defendant, from and after the
finding of the indictment, without the protection
afforded by the presence of counsel, contravenes the basic dictates of fairness in the conduct
of criminal causes and the fundamental rights
of persons charged with crime."
If the Michigan Supreme Court adopts the same
rule that the New York Court did in the Waterman
case-and my guess is that it will-then the police
of Michigan (or rather I should say, the people of
Michigan) will be confronted with an intolerable
situation. What the two rules put together will
mean is this: after the judicial process has started
there can be no interrogation of the accused; and
after arrest there can be no interrogation of the
arrestee, since he must be brought before a committing magistrate without unnecessary delay. In
other words, police interrogations will be outlawed altogether.
The seriousness of this development can be
fully appreciated only when consideration is
given to the fact that under such restrictions most
serious crimes will go unsolved, because the only
way most of them can be solved is by the interrogation of persons under suspicion. This point I
need not labor to you men. But it certainly needs
hammering home to some judges and legislators.
I referred to the Mallory case earlier-the U. S.
Supreme Court decision outlawing a confession
obtained by federal officers during a delay in
taking the arrestee before a federal commissioner*
for arraignment. I think you'll be interested in
what Mallory, the rapist, did after the Supreme
Court turned him loose. Shortly thereafter he
assaulted the daughter of a woman who had befriended him. Later he was caught in Philadelphia
while burglarizing the home of a woman who
claimed he raped her. Mallory was convicted of
burglary and aggravated assault.
JuDIciAL LEGISLATION
Earlier I referred to the Supreme Court's indulgence in judicial legislation. Let me illustrate
what I had in mind.
In the famous (or infamous) case of McNabb v.
United States," you may recall that the Court
relied upon an old federal statute which dealt
with the arraignment of arrested persons, and the
Court's opinion related how this statute was
1 Supra note 8.

intended to guard against "the evil implication of
secret interrogation of persons accused of crime."
As a matter of fact the statutory provision had
no such purpose back of it. It had been tacked onto
an appropriation bill for the purpose of putting
an end to a practice that existed about the 1890's
whereby federal commissioners and marshalls were
cheating the government in the matter of fees and
mileage expense charges. That's why they were
thereafter required to take an arrested person
before the nearest magistrate. Moreover, there
was no reference at all to the time when this was
to be done. The Court filled that in.
Furthermore, in the McNabb case you will also
recall how the Court erroneously assumed that
the defendants had not been promptly arraigned.
And even when that fact had been called to the
court's attention in a petition for a rehearing, the
petition was denied.
A further example of the Court's eagerness to
ascribe to a statute a meaning which was not at
all in the minds of the legislators concerns Section
605 of the Federal Communications Act. Section
605 was not aimed at law enforcement officers as
a prohibition against wiretapping for law enforcement purposes. It was merely a 1934 re-enactment
of a provision in the Radio Act of 1927, with an
entirely different purpose in mind.
Another example of the Court's propensity to
distort the meaning and purpose of a statutory
provision in order to reach a result commensurate
with the Court's own philosophy is Carroll v.
United States.1 2 That case held that the government
had no right to appeal from a trial court order
suppressing evidence on the ground of an unreasonable search and seizure. It viewed appeals
by the Government to be "unusual, exceptional,
not favored." And this is a case where it seems
clear to many, including the Court of Appeals,
that the Congress wanted to confer that right
upon the government.
LEGISLATIVE RESTRIcTIONS

Not only have the courts been unduly restricting
the police and prosecution, many legislatures have
been doing the same thing. In Illinois we now
have a statute prohibiting any kind of electronic
eavesdropping over the telephone, on the street,
or Anywhere else.13 And mind you, this was not a
piece of legislation engineered by the hoodlum
element of Illinois; it was the work of some starryeyed civil libertarians.
12354 U.S. 448 (1957).
13ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 14-1 - 14-7 (1961).
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Anyone with law enforcement experience in
metropolitan areas, or in the federal government,
knows all too well that wiretapping and other
electronic eavesdropping activities are indispensible to effective law enforcement. To be sure, there
must be controls upon the police to prevent abuses.
But there are all too many legislators and others
who will not lift their heads out of the sand and
face up to the practical realities of law enforcement.
I could go on with additional illustrations, but
these few should serve to permit me to draw some
conclusions for your consideration.
CONCLUSION
We can't have "domestic tranquility" and
"promote the general welfare" as prescribed in
the Preamble to the Constitution when all the
concern is upon "individual civil liberties."
Individual rights and liberties cannot exist in a
vacuum. Alongside of them we must have a stable
society, a safe society; otherwise there will be no
medium in which to exercise such rights and
liberties. To have "rights" without safety of life,
limb, and property is a meaningless thing. Individual civil liberties, considered apart from their
relationship to public safety and security, are
like labels on empty bottles.
This truism that we can't have unbridled individual liberties and at the same time have a

safe, stable society is the first message that we
must get across to the pulblic.
I am fed up with such platitudes as "the right
to be let alone"--when it is used as though it
were an unconditional right. Sure, as individuals,
we all would like to be let alone. You and I at
times would like to do as we please. If we are in a
hurry to go somewhere in our car, we might want
to run a red light or to exceed the speed limit and
be let alone after we do it. The burglar, the robber,
the rapist would also like to be let alone. But in
the interest of public safety and public welfare,
there must be reasonable restraints upon the
conduct and activities of all of us.
And talking about wants, let us have these
wants alongside the want to be let alone. I want
to be able to walk along the street after dark and
be relatively secure that someone will not crack
my skull for the money in my wallet. I want my
daughter to be able to walk home after dark and
be relatively free from being dragged into an alley
and raped. I want property owners to be reasonably free from racketeers, and from the thefts
committed by burglars, robbers, and others.
The public must be made aware of the practicalities of law enforcement. They must be made
to understand that law enforcement officers cannot
offer the required protection demanded of them
from within the strait-jacket placed upon them
by present day court and legislative restrictions.

THE CAREER PROSECUTOR OF CANADA
HENRY H. BULL
The author was recently appointed Crown Attorney of the City of Toronto at County of York,
Toronto, Ontario, Canada. He served as Assistant Crown Attorney in Toronto at the time this
article was prepared.
This article is from an address given at the Short Course for Prosecuting Attorneys at the Northwestern University School of Law on July 31, 1961.
Not every prosecutor in Canada is a career man.
There are those who look upon the position as a
temporary training ground, prolific of experienceas a transitory step in a broader legal career-as a
part-time adjunct to bolster an inadequate practice-or asa refuge from therigoursof a competitive
profession. There are those, however, of whom I
like to count myself as one, who with a sense of
dedication consider this their avocation, who
bridle at the question so often asked by the Perry
Masons acting for the defence "when are you going
to quit prosecuting and get on the right side?"

Never, in nearly a quarter of a century, has it ever
occurred to me that I was on the wrong side.
In making comparisons of the Canadian and
American prosecutors, it must not be taken that I
make any claim to the superiority of the Canadian
system or that I am critical of any other. Any partiality I may show is that natural preference that
one has for what is familiar to him and what is his
own.
It might perhaps have been expected that the
difference -between us would be obvious-that the
image of the Canadian prosecutor was an integral
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part of the picture of rough and ready barrel-head
justice being meted out to parka-ed and muk
luk-ed Eskimos by an itinerant magistrate who,
while flanked by red-coated Mounties, raps for
order on a cask of whale blubber with a frozen seal
fin.
On the contrary, it is the similarities which are
obvious and the differences which are difficult of
discernment.
AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS Or THE ADMINISTRATION
Or JUSTICE IN CANADA
SIMILARITIES WITH

E UNITED STATES

The judge, the jury, the witness, the accused and
his counsel, the prosecutor, each plays his part and
follows the same script that, making allowance for
the peculiarities of local custom, you are so familiar
with at home.
There you recognize the same methods of proof,
the same rules of evidence, the same trial technique, the same presumption of innocence, and as
you heard the judge's rulings solemnly sounding
through the courtroom like an echo from your own,
you would realize that this too was a court not only
of law, but of justice.
This similarity is founded in history-founded
in the common heritage we share of the English
Common Law, with its beginnings in the customs
and practices of the fields and farms and roads
and villages of our Anglo-Saxon and Norman forebears, who realized that freedom is not so much a
matter of the formulation of sonorous abstractions,
as of protecting the rights of each single person in
the state, and that the test of freedom lies in the
rights of the individual and in the readiness of the
law to uphold them.
This similarity is also founded in the constant
progress towards the democratic ideal.
Four centuries after Magna Carta this concept
was brought to these shores by the first settlers
who, with their successors, imbued with a zeal for
freedom, and endowed with pioneer energy forged
it into the guarantees that are commonplace today
and are common to our two nations: the maintenance of right-the liberty of the individual-the
dignity of man.
DIFFERENCES WITH THE UNITED STATES

But, as you sat in that courtroom and watched
the prosecutor, the Crown Attorney, in traditional
gown of barrister's stuff or Q.C.'s silk, ply his trade
before the judge and jury, examining and crossexamining, objecting, submitting, pleading, argu-
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ing very much as you would, you might ask yourself "Are we the same? Does that title, Crown Attorney, have a significance I cannot see? Do those
black robes discreetly conceal a subtle difference, a
difference which is a reflection of the fundamental
difference of the political philosophy of our two
countries?"
Although we can be said to be equally successful
in arriving at our present stage in the development
of democracy, we have done so by means that are
remarkably dissimilar. Let us explore for a moment
the paths of our constitutional histories.
The birth of the American nation was accompanied by a drastic and complete severance with
the Mother Country. The basic principles of its
system of government, conceived in a spirit of national independence, were firmly established by
the end of the 18th century and reflected the political philosophy of the era. American institutions
rest on the assumption that the whole job of representing the will of the people should not be entrusted to one authority, that the essence of good
government lies in the division of power by a system of checks and balances.
On the other hand, the transition of Canada
from colony to nation has been a much more
gradual process of constitutional evolution. It was
not until 1867 that the Dominion of Canada as a
federation of provinces was created. Even then it
did not achieve sovereign statehood. Its foreign
affairs were still controlled exclusively by Britain,
and even in its domestic matters it was not entirely
free. The evolution continued, however, until independent national status was recognized at the
end of the First World War and ultimately confirmed by the Statute of Westminster in 1931.
Canada now is a completely antonomous constitutional monarchy, holding equal status with Great
Britain and the other nations in the British Commonwealth.
Her political system has been fashioned in the
main after the British constitutional tradition as it
had developed through the 18th century and on
into the 19th. There Parliament had succeeded in
taking over most of the powers of the King. Cabinets made up of elected representatives of the
people and responsible to Parliament gained complete control over the executive branch of government, and in addition, as leaders of an increasingly
well disciplined party 'majority, they were able to
direct the legislative activities of Parliament.
This constitutional tradition came to be based
on not the separation but the fusion of powers.
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Instead of balancing power against power, democracy was achieved by making the Prime Minister
and his Cabinet fully responsible for carrying out.
the will of the electorate. All of which being done
in the name of the Crown.
It is in this context that we should once more
look at the black-robed figure of the prosecutor in
the courtroom. But before we strip him of his trappings, let us take another brief glance into history
to help us better understand what we shall see.
At the end of the American War of Independence, only a generation after the conquest of New
France by the British and the establishment of the
rule of law for both victor and vanquished, there
came the impact of the migration of thousands of
Loyalists from south of the border. Settling in the
Maritimes along the Atlantic Coast and in the
central region now known as Ontario, but then
called Upper Canada, they brought with them not
only their original English heritage but the heritage of a hundred eighty years 'of development in
the'American colonies towards freedom and liberty.
They shared the same zeal as the framers of the
Declaration of Independence for the ideals to be
desired, but differed violently as to the manner in
which these ideals were to be attained. They were
not prepared to abandon the institution of the
monarchy and preferred to achieve their ends by
constitutional means.
Whether they came from the rugged frontier
with its pioneer ways or from the older colonies
where life had been settled and refined if not effete,
they all had this in common: they had been prepared to stand by their principles, many of them to
fight for them, and, stripped of their homes, their
goods, their wealth, were prepared to make a new
start in a new and unknown land. With none of the
facilities, comforts, or amenities to which many of
them had been accustomed, they began with axe
and adze to hew a home for themselves out of the
wilderness.
But more important than the homes they built
was the framework of government they erected.
English Civil Law and trial by jury were quickly
established, and the foundations were soon laid
for representative and local government.
It has been said by some that this early establishment of local government by the Loyalists in
central and eastern Canada may be one reason
why those pioneer provinces differed in many
respects from the frontier areas of the United
States.
The bitterness engendered by the war made

them look with suspicion on the institutions
created by the Americhn Constitution, and they
therefore leaned heavily towards the basic principles then extant in England.
Having seen an electorate become what they
considered a band of mutinous rebels, they were
slow to place the power directly in the hands of
the majority. It took them half a century to fully
accomplish representative and responsible government. They shied away from the elective process
for any office, judicial or administrative, and
reserved it only for their .representatives in the
legislatures and municipal councils.
It was in this climate that the young country
grew, a climate modified by the influence of the
War of 1812, which nurtured a sense of national
identity; by the influence of the non-Loyalist
immigrants from south of the border with their
leanings towards republican and more democratic
forms of government; and by the influence of the
arrival of tens of thousands of immigrants from
the British Isles with their strong feelings for
monarchy.
A NEED FOR A COUNTY "PROSECUTOR"

By 1857, ten eyears before Confederation, the
growing population, with the concomittant growing business of the criminal courts, was pushing
settlement and civilization farther and farther
into the remoter pal ts of the country, away from
the shoreline* of the natural inland waterway of
the Great Lakes. Means of travel and communication were still in an elementary state. They
consisted for the most- part of water, horse, and
stage coach; the railroad just completed between
Toronto and Montreal was as yet of little value in
reaching the hinterland. Roads were either nonexistant or primitive and often impassable, due
to lack of development and to the rigours of the
climate.
All of this made it increasingly difficult for the
law officers of the Crown-the Attorney-General
and his agents, located at the central seat of
government-to attend effectively to their duties
with respect to the administration of justice in the
remoter parts of the province.
Provision was therefore made for the appointment of a Crown Attorney for each county in the
province to aid in the local administration of
justice. The powers and duties then assigned to
him have remained substantially the same until
the present day.
The office was indigenous to Ontario. There was
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and still is in England no similar provision for a
uniform system of permanent officials appointed
for the local administration of justice. The law
officers of the Crown-the Attorney-General, the
Director of Public Prosecutions (an office which
post dates the office of Crown Attorney), and
Crown counsel appointed ad hoc for a particular
place, a particular sitting, or a particular prosecution-perform some of the functions of a Crown
Attorney but not all. There is still a considerable
amount of resistance in England to the idea of
professional prosecutors, whether they be temporary or permanent.
In the rest of Canada today the other provinces
have either followed the pattern created in Ontario
or have developed systems of their own adapted
to their'local requirements.

[Vol. 53

functions with respect to minor offences, which
make up the vast bulk of the work of the inferior
courts. In the remote northern areas they also act
as justices of the peace.
The familiar red-coated figure of the Mountie
not only has beconie the national trade marl of
Canada to the rest of the world, but also at home
is a symbol of law and order contributing in no
small measure to the respect in which the law is
generally held.
THE CRIMINAL LAWS OF CANADA: ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION
THE CRIMINAL CODE

One of the specific fields assigned to the Federal
Parliament is that of criminal law and procedure.
Under that authority have been enacted the

Criminal Code of Canada and certain other
statutes dealing with specific matters, such as
This force, originally known as the North West trade combines and narcotic drugs; in all of these
Mounted Police, was created in 1873 to forestall statutes is embodied thie whole of the criminal
any trouble in our West with the Indians and with law, both substantive and procedural, which is
the lawlessness that you were experiencing on uniform for the whole country.
The provinces have no authority to legislate
your own frontiers. We were fortunate that the
first' settlers, being primarily interested in fur- in the field of criminal law, although they may
trading, had established and maintained relatively provide for penalties including fines and imprisonamicable relationships with the Indians for ment for the enforcement of legislation made in
economic reasons. The population was sparse and pursuance of their specific powers. These offences
the infiltration of new-comers gradual, with no are referred to as quasi-crimes, since they are
great trek or mass movement towards the moun- dealt with in the same manner as minor offences
tains and the West Coast. Canada was spared a o under the Criminal Code. Specific examples are
civil war of her own, and the upheaval caused by to be found in traffic and liquor offences.
yours was not felt to any great degree north of the
THE COURT SYSTEM
border.
When it comes tQ the enforcement of the law
The Mounted Police, a thoroughly trained,
semi-military force under rigid discipline, early and the administration of justice there is a shift
earned the respect of settler and Indian alike with in the emphasis. These matters fall withintheexclua reputation for effectiveness, impartial fairness, sive legislative powers of the individual provinces.
In each province this power includes the constiand above all, for incorruptible integrity.
This reputation they still enjoy today. Their tution, maintenance and organization of the
operations have been extended from the original provincial courts of both civil and criminal
policing of our western frontiers to those of a jurisdiction.
Each province has set up its own juridical system
national police force. As such they concentrate
of trial and appellate courts at all levels. Although
their efforts on such matters as national security,
immigration, customs and excise, revenue and individual to their respective provinces, these
systems are virtually the same. Generally speaking
coinage offences, and the narcotic drug traffic.
there are three levels of criminal courts, and alIn addition they operate under contract in eight
of the ten provinces as provincial police (Ontario though the names vary from province to province,
their respective jurisdictions are similar throughand Quebec have their own forces), policing
out the country. Reference can be made therefore,
generally wherever there are no, or inadequate,
local or municipal forces to do so. In the smaller for the purpose of illustrations, to those in Ontario.
The Supreme Court, which is the top echelon,
communities and sparsely settled areas where
there is no full time prosecutor, they perform his has jurisdiction to try any indictable offence. The
THE NORTHWEST MOUNTED POLICE
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distinction between felony and misdemeanour
having been abolished in Canada, all offences are
divided into two classes depending on the method
of trial: indictable offences, which embrace the
more serious and general crimes; and summary
conviction offences, which are the lesser offences.
The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to
try the gravest 6f the indictable offences-murder,
manslaughter, treason, rape and the like-and, as
a general rule, persons accused of these lastmentioned offences must be tried by a court composed of a judge and jury.
Jurisdiction at the lowest echelon is exercised
by the Magistrates' Courts. In addition to all
summary conviction offences, of which traffic
offences make up the greatest part, magistrates
have absolute jurisdiction to try a number of
indictable offences, such as petty theft, assaults,
gambling, prostitution, and so on. In addition, on
the election of the accused, a magistrate may try
any person charged with an indictable offence
other than those expressly declared to be within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Since trials in the Magistrates' Courts are
summary and speedy, by far the greatest majority
of cases, estimated at 90 to 95 per cent of all
criminal trials, are heard by a magistrate sitting
without a jury.
Where a, person is accused of an indictable
offence which is within the exclusive jurisdiction
neither of the Supreme Court nor of the magistrate, he may elect to be tried by a court composed
of a County Court Judge sitting with a juryknown as the General Sessions of the Peace-or a
County Court Judge sitting alone without a juryknown as the County Court Judges' Criminal
Court. Both these courts exist in every county.
Appeals from convictions in all of these courts
may be taken to the provincial Court of Appeal,
in some instances as of right, in others only with
leave.of the Court. The Crown may appeal from
acquittal on questions of law but not from findings
of fact.
Appeals may be taken from the provincial
Courts of Appeal on questions of law to the
Supreme Court of Canada.
SELECTION AND TENURE OF jUDGES, CROWN
ATTORNEYS AND ASSISTANT CROWN ATTORNEYS

Judges and Court Officials
The constitution requires that the judges of the
Superior, County and District Courts in each
province be appointed by the Dominion Govern-

ment for life (which is presumed to end at 75)
and to hold office during good behavior. They can
be removed only by impeachment. The magistrates are appointed by the Province for life and
good behavior. All other court officials, clerks,
sheriffs, bailiffs, and the like, are appointed by
the Province during pleasure. Into this category
in Ontario fall all Crown Attorneys and their
Assistants.
Crown.Attorneys
Although I have said the appointment of the
Crown Attorney is a provincial one, it is, in effect,
an appointment by the Crown. Canada being a
constitutional monarchy, governmental authority
rests in theory in the monarch, who cannot act
alone, but only by and with the advice of her
ministers, who are elected representatives responsible to Parliament, and whose advise she never
rejects:
Being othdrwise engaged on the other side of
the Atlantic, the Queen carries on her function of
government- in Canada through her representatives. In federal matters she is represented by
the Governor General, who is advised by the
Privy Council for Canada, made up of the Prime
Minister and his Cabinet. In provincial matters
she is represented by the Lieutenant-Governor
(not to be confused with your nomenclature),
who is advised by the Executive Council, made up
of the Premier of the Province (the equivalent of
your Governor) and his Cabinet.
The appointment of Crown Attorneys is made
by the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council, which is
to say, by the Queen, on the advice of her ministers.
In practice the Attorney General of the Province,
who is a Minister of the Crown, makes his choice
of a suitable member of the Bar in good standing
and recommends his nominee to his colleagues for
confirmation by Order-in-Council.
The appointment is during the pleasure of the
Lieutenant Governor, who it seems is very easy
to please. Recently a Crown Attorney retired on
pension after over forty years in office; another is
still going vigorously at the age of 80 or better.
In my own jurisdiction the present incumbent is
only the third to hold the office since the First
World War. He has been Crown Attorney for
eleven years, prior to which he was an Assistant
for twenty-one years.
Removal from office must also be by Order-inCouncil and other than for obvious reasons of
health or age would be for malfeasance or misfeasance.
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Assistant Crown Attorneys
The appointment of Assistants is made similarly
to that of Crown Attorneys, that is to say by the
Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council, to hold office
during pleasure. They may be employed full-time
or part-time as the local need demands. In York
County, where I come from,-a jurisdiction of
dose to 1 Y million people--there are 12 full-time
and several part-time Assistants.
When the need arises for replacements or additions, the Crown Attorney makes a selection on a
basis of merit from those members of the Bar who
have applied for or who he knows are interested
in the position. His recommendation is then made
to the Attorney .General, who usually accepts it.
There is less permanency among Assistants than
among the Crown Attorneys, inasmuch as many
of them look upon the job as a temporary training
period for a career of advocacy, others are not
content with the modest emoluments of the
position, and still others turn out to be unsuited.
On the other hand there are those who, as I have
done for twenty-two years, make it a career.
The Assistants act-under the direction of the
Crown Attorney and when so acting have the like
powers and perform the like duties as he does.
Everything I now say, therefore, about the nature
and function of the office of Crown Attorney
applies with equal force to his Assistants.
Appointment of Crown Attorneys
Non-political
The office is non-political, except in so far as an
Attorney General is apt to show some preference
for members of his own party when making an
appointment. I know of many cases where persons
of opposite political stripe have been appointed,
but it has been many years and before my recollection since anyone has been fired for political
reasons. The patronage system is rapidly becoming a*thing of the past, and all civil servants,
federal and provincial, enjoy the same sort of
security. This we believe makes for stability of
administration.
The Crown Attorney, of course, may not engage
in any political activity, and, in fact, in the
larger centres, they, like judges.and magistrates,
are disfranchised.
THE OFFICE OF THE CROWN ATTORNEY

Authority and Duties
The Crown Attorney's principle function is to
prosecute in all the provincial courts I have
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mentioned persons charged with indictable
offences and where in his opinion the public
interest so requires conduct proceedings in respect
of summary conviction offences.
There is in Canada no counterpart to the
United States Attorney, since there are no federal
courts of first instance in criminal matters and no
federal court system. The Supreme Court of
Canada, which sits at the nation's capital at
Ottawa, is entirely appellate as the court of last
resort from the Courts of Appeal of the various
provinces in matters civil and criminal.
As a provincial civil servant the Crown Attorney
is responsible for the proper conduct of his office
to the Executive and in particular to the Attorney
General, whose agent he is. Although appointed
for a specific locality-usually a county-he is
in no sense a municipal official, nor is heresponsible
to the local municipal authorities.
The office being appointive rather than elective,
the Crown Attorney is not responsible directly to
the electorate. This has profound significance. He
is free of the external pressure and influence from
groups or individuals who might be tempted for
their own ends, well-meaning or nefarious, to
pervert the course of justice. He is free of the
internal pressure of political ambition, the urge
for self advancement, and the desire for public
acclaim that might lead him to strive for convictions rather than to see that justice is done.
The Crown Attorney, a public officer engaged
in the administration of justice in criminal matters,
does not deal with the civil side and is not available to the public for advice or assistance in that
respect. He has certain administrative and ancillary powers. not germane to these discussions, but
his most important function is the. prosecution of
criminal offences.
He does not in practice institute criminal proceedings on his own initiative. Although there is
power to do so, it is one which is sparingly used
and only in exceptional circumstances. All criminal
proceedings are commenced by information or
complaint sworn by an individual, whether private
citizen or law enforcement officer, before a justice
of the peace.
He Is Not A Policeman
The Crown Attorney is not a law enforcement
officer; that is a policeman's function. He is not a
gangbuster, nor is he bent on ferretting out the lawbreaker and bringing him to the bar of justice.
He has no investigatory' staff of his own, and
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although he necessarily works in dose conjunction
with the local police in the preparation of cases
and their prosecution to a proper conclusion, he
has no jurisdiction or authority over them.
He may, and quite frequently does, give advice
to persons, including police, who wish to lay
charges, as to whether a criminal offence is disclosed by the facts, whether a prima fade case is
made out, and whether a prosecution is justified.
If he finds that these things are so he refers the
person to the police for further action or directly
to a justice, who will exercise his discretion as to
whether he will issue his process.
For all practical purposes it can be said that the
Crown Attorney comes into the picture after the
proceedings have been commenced. He then
assumes the responsibility for the prosecution,
doing all things requisite for the speedy, efficient,
and proper disposition of the case. In this he is
assisted by the police in charge of the case, who,
although he has no authority over them, willingly
accede to his requests and take his direction for
investigation and preparation. He however takes
no direct part in the investigation such as taking
statements or confessions from accused persons
which I understand is the practice in some of
your jurisdictions. Such matters he leaves to the
police.
He, then, is the attorney for the people or the
State against the accused in a proceeding in which
the State dissociates itself from the act of its own
member, denunciating his conduct and exhibiting
an antagonism in its will against the will of the
wrong-doer.
He Is An Attorney For The Crown
The Crown Attorney however is something
more. The Crown embraces the whole of the state
including the wrong-doer himself. On the one
hand the monarch, in return for the fealty and
allegiance of the subject, guarantees that the
subject shall enjoy peace--the Queen's Peace.
On the other hand the monarch has repeatedly
guaranteed to every subject, since King John
affixed his seal to the Great Charter on the meadows of Runnymede, the right of fair trial and
due process of law.
It is in this sense that I and my colleagues are
attorneys for the Crown.
All criminal prosecutions are carried on in the
name of the Crown and are styled "The Queen
against John Doe" or sometimes in Latin, Regina
versus Doe.

The retention of this terminology I consider to
be important. As the Crown symbolizes for the
people their principles, rights, and liberties, the
carriage of the symbolism into the Courts helps
to maintain and preserve a respect for the law.
We have retained a measure of the tradition
and ceremony of the English Courts, which again
enhances the dignity of the law and its place in
the community. Our judges wear robes of different colours, robes according to the courts in which
they sit, and the lawyers, when appearing in the
higher courts, wear black gown, wing collars, and
white Geneve tabs, but have discarded the wig. The
Sheriff, who attends the judge in court, wears a
cocked hat and frock coat and carries a sword.
Even out of court, judges affect a semi-formal
attire, wearing, except on the most informal
occasions, director's suit (black jacket and striped
trousers, with black homburg hat).
In Toronto every year just after the New Year,
on the day of the opening of the Winter sittings
of the Supreme Court, known as Assize, and Nisi
Prius, Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol
Delivery, a special service is held in one of the
downtown churches, attended by the Lieutenant
Governor, the Attorney General, the judges and
magistrates of all the courts, Supreme, County
and Municipal-all in their robes-, the Bencherg
of the Law Society, Court officials, and members of
the legal profession. It is a dignified and impressive
affair, which strikes an appropriate key-note for
the ensuing transaction of the business of the
Courts.
He Is A Minister Of Justice
A criminal prosecution in our law is not a contest
between individuals, nor is it a contest between the
Crown endeavouring to obtain a conviction and
the accused endeavouring to be acquitted.
The position of the Crown Attorney is not that
of ordinary counsel in a civil case; he is acting in
a quasi-judicial capacity or as a minister of justice
and ought to regard himself as part of the Court
rather than as aft advocate. He is not to struggle
for a conviction nor be betrayed by feelings of
professional rivalry to regard the question at issue
as one of professional superiority and a contest of
skill and pre-eminence.
He is present in court to present the case for the
Crown and has a: discretion to do so as he sees fit.
This discretion must be exercised with a feeling
of responsibility to assist the judge in fairly putting
the case before the jury. He also has a discretion
to decide what witnesses should be called and
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what evidence is relevant, credible, and material,
and his discretion will not be interfered with
unless it is exercised with some oblique motive.
But he has a duty to offer all the relevant evidence
no matter how it may tell-against the accused
or in his favour-and to call all credible and
material witnesses to the occurrence even if they
are likely to give different accounts of what took
place. He must not hold back or suppress credible
evidence that would assist the accused.
Fairness, moderation, and dignity should characterize his conduct throughout. He is engaged in
an investigation which should be conducted
without feeling or animus on the part of the prosecution with a single view of determining the truth.
This is not to say that the Crown must be
supine in the performance of his duties. As Lord
Eldon said:
"Truth is best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the question."
The adversary system is fundamental to the
Anglo-American forensic process.
Vigour is frequently demanded to see that the
court is not misled-that the course of justice is
not warped. Counsel must not be hoodwinked by
those who, while affecting to tell the truth are
really twisting facts to help the prisoner, and he
must assiduously cross-examine the witnesses for
the defence to find out how far they can be relied
upon. He must be alert stalwartly to oppose the
counsel who allows his duty to his client to transcend his duty to the Court, to the State, and to his
conscience.
Finally when he has brought out all the facts
thoroughly, argued his points of law intelligently
and effectively, he is entitled in his final address
to the jury to examine all the evidence and to ask
the jury to come to the conclusion that the accused is guilty as charged. In all this he has a duty
to assist the jury, but he exceeds that duty when
he expresses by inflammatory or vindictive
language his own personal opinion that the
accused is guilty.
CONCLUSION
In a recent trial for murder, Crown Counsel
allowed himself to be carried away by the ardour
of battle to the point that, having already indicated his personal belief in the guilt of the accused,
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he had this to say (this is a translation of the
original French):
"Every day we see more and more crimes
than ever, thefts, and many another thing.
At least one who commits armed robbery
does not make his victim suffer as Boucher
made Jabour suffer. It is a revolting crime
for a man with all the strength of his age, of
an athlete against an old man of 77, who is
not capable of defending himself. I have
little respect for those who steal when they
have at least given their victim a chance to
defend himself, but I have no sympathy for
these dastards who strike men, friendsJabour was perhaps not a friend, but he was
a neighbour, at least they knew each otherin a cowardly manner with blows of an axe.
"... [AInd if you bring in a verdict of guilty,
for once it will be almost a pleasure fbr me
to ask the death penalty for him."
The Supreme Court of Canada quashed the
conviction and ordered a new trial. Mr. Justice
Rand had this to say:
"It cannot be over-emphasised that the
purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to
obtain a conviction; it is to lay before the
jury what the Crown considers to be credible
evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a
crime. Counsel have a duty to see that all
available legal proof of the facts is presented: it should be done firmly and pressed
to its legitimate length but it must be done
fairly. The role of prosecutor excludes any
notion of winning or losing; his function is
a matter of public duty than which in civil
life there can be none charged with greater
personal responsibility. It is to. be efficiently
performed with an ingrained sense of the
dignity, the seriousness and the justness of
the judicial proceedings."
The achievement of these ends is' our endeavour,
these ideals our aspiration. To them we bring,
imperfect as our own human fraiity dictates, our
intellects, skills and knowledge, an understanding
of our fellowman, a compassion for the weakness
of the wrong-doer, and a sympathy for his victim,
a dignity, a courtesy, a fairness, respect for the
law, and a fearless courage for what is right-but
above all-integrity.
This is our career.

